Transformations  in
Business & Economics

RESEARCH ON THE TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR OF ONLINE ANCHORS IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
Xuefeng Shao, Shi Chen, Yang Song, Shitong Yan

ABSTRACT: This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model between anchors, a livestreaming platform, and a taxation department. Through the game model solution and numerical simulation, we determine that the income distribution scheme affects the tax compliance behavior of online anchors and that the willingness of anchors to pay taxes will be significantly increased when their income distribution ratio is appropriately increased. The high cost of auditing is the main reason for the difficulties in enforcing many tax regulations. This problem also exists in the regulation of online anchors’ tax compliance behavior, either to reduce the cost of regulation and achieve the accurate monitoring of anchors and livestreaming platforms or to increase the penalty to deter the tax evasion behavior of anchors and platforms. Credit, as an inherent constraint mechanism for tax compliance, has a significant impact on both anchors and platforms.

KEYWORDS:  sharing economy, personal income tax, tax compliance, evolutionary game model.

JEL classification:  C73, D31, H26.